Meses: septiembre 2014

Se ha publicado un artículo de razonamiento formalizado en Coq titulado [Combining proofs and programs in a dependently typed language](

Sus autores son Chris Casinghino, Vilhelm Sjöberg y Stephanie Weirich (de la Universidad de Pensilvania, EE.UU.).

Su resumen es

Most dependently-typed programming languages either require that all expressions terminate (e.g. Coq, Agda, and Epigram), or allow infinite loops but are inconsistent when viewed as logics (e.g. Haskell, ATS, Ωmega. Here, we combine these two approaches into a single dependently-typed core language. The language is composed of two fragments that share a common syntax and overlapping semantics: a logic that guarantees total correctness, and a call-by-value programming language that guarantees type safety but not termination. The two fragments may interact: logical expressions may be used as programs; the logic may soundly reason about potentially nonterminating programs; programs can require logical proofs as arguments; and “mobile” program values, including proofs computed at runtime, may be used as evidence by the logic. This language allows programmers to work with total and partial functions uniformly, providing a smooth path from functional programming to dependently-typed programming.

El trabajo se presentó en el POPL 2014 (41st ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages).

El código de las correspondientes teorías en … se encuentra aquí.

Se ha publicado un artículo de razonamiento formalizado en Coq titulado Mechanized network origin and path authenticity proofs.

Sus autores son Fuyuan Zhang, Limin Jia, Cristina Basescu, Tiffany Hyun-Jin Kim, Yih-Chun Hu y Adrian Perrig.

Su resumen es

A secure routing infrastructure is vital for secure and reliable Internet services. Source authentication and path validation are two fundamental primitives for building a more secure and reliable Internet. Although several protocols have been proposed to implement these primitives, they have not been formally analyzed for their security guarantees. In this paper, we apply proof techniques for verifying cryptographic protocols (e.g., key exchange protocols) to analyzing network protocols. We encode LS 2, a program logic for reasoning about programs that execute in an adversarial environment, in Coq. We also encode protocol-specific data structures, predicates, and axioms. To analyze a source-routing protocol that uses chained MACs to provide origin and path validation, we construct Coq proofs to show that the protocol satisfies its desired properties. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to formalize origin and path authenticity properties, and mechanize proofs that chained MACs can provide the desired authenticity properties.

El trabajo se presentará en el ACM CCS 2014 (21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security).

El código de las correspondientes teorías en Coq se encuentra aquí.